Taking a Look at the Modem Takings Clause Jurisprudence: Finding Private Property Protection Under the Federal and Utah Constitutions by Tufts, David W.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1994 | Issue 4 Article 4
11-1-1994
Taking a Look at the Modem Takings Clause
Jurisprudence: Finding Private Property Protection
Under the Federal and Utah Constitutions
David W. Tufts
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Property Law and
Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David W. Tufts, Taking a Look at the Modem Takings Clause Jurisprudence: Finding Private Property Protection Under the Federal and Utah
Constitutions, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 893 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1994/iss4/4
Taking a Look at the Modern Takings Clause 
Jurisprudence: Finding Private Property 
Protection Under the Federal 
and Utah Constitutions* 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution 
both contain provisions which restrict government's ability to 
infringe upon private property interests. The Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution provides: "[Plrivate property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa- 
tion."' The Utah Constitution has a similar provision: "Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without 
just   om pens at ion.''^ At first glance, these constitutional provi- 
sions seem simple, yet courts have struggled to establish a 
consistent interpretation and application of their protections. 
This Comment explores the United States Supreme Court's 
analysis in interpreting and applying the Fifth Amendment's 
Takings Clause, and examines the Utah Supreme Court's anal- 
ysis in applying the Utah Constitution's corresponding provi- 
sion. 
Part I1 of this Comment presents a condensed overview of 
modern takings analysis, briefly outlining the analytical steps 
followed in applying both the federal provision and the Utah 
provision. This part is designed to serve as a quick reference 
for the practitioner who is exploring takings questions. Part I11 
gives a detailed explanation of the United State Supreme 
Court's Takings Clause analysis, examining the fundamental 
theories that have driven the evolution of its modern interpre- 
tation. Part XV examines in detail the Utah Supreme Court's 
analysis of takings questions under article I, section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution. While the Utah court's analysis is signifi- 
* Copyright@ 1994 by David W. Tufts. B.S.C.E. 1992, Brigham Young 
University; J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. The author wishes to thank John Fellows for providing the incentive to 
produce this Comment. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2. UTAH CONST. art. I, $ 22. 
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cant, it does not match the United States Supreme Court's 
analysis in either complexity or breadth. 
A. The United States Supreme Court's Analysis Under the 
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause3 
In applying the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the 
United States Supreme Court follows a bifurcated analysis, 
applying one analysis to regulations that deny an owner eco- 
nomically viable use of her land and another to regulations 
that do not substantially advance a legitimate state interest. 
Accordingly, governmental actions that affect private property 
interests effect a taking if they (1) deny an owner economically 
viable use of her land, or (2) fail to substantially advance a 
legitimate state i n t e r e ~ t . ~  
3. This Comment is by no means the first piece of scholarly work that has 
attempted to analyze the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence and sum- 
marize the rules of law in this complex constitutional issue. See, e.g., John J. 
Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Is- 
sue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983) (presenting a comprehensive model for takings 
analysis). In 1988 a conference held at  Dartmouth College presented the ideas of 
several professors and practitioners in light of the four takings cases handed down 
by the Supreme Court in 1987 (Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
US.  304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); and Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)). The works prepared for this 
conference are reproduced in the December 1988 issue of the COLUMBIA LAW RE- 
VIEW. Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1752 (1988); William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism 
in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581 (1988); William W. Fisher 111, The Signifi- 
cance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1774 
(1988); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is 
Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988); Frank Michelman, Tak- 
ings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman Takings]; Frank 
Michelman, A Reply to Susan Rose-Ackerman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1712 (1988); 
Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris- 
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988); Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLIJM. L. REV. 1697 (1988); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731 
(1988); T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution. and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1714 (1988). 
A compendium of current, informative and thought-provoking works on the Tak- 
ings Clause can also be found in William C. Leigh & Bmce W. Burton, Predatory 
Cibvernmental Zoning Practices and the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause For- 
mulation: Timing, Value, and R.I.B.E., 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 876 app. B. 
4. See infia part II1.B. 
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I .  Governmental actions that deny an owner economically 
viable use of her land5 
The first analysis applied by the Court examines govern- 
mental actions that affect the value or use of a person's private 
property interest. Land-use regulations are the most common 
type of governmental actions reviewed under this analysis. The 
rule is that regulations that deny an owner economically viable 
use of her land will be found t o  violate the Takings Clause 
whenever the regulations go "too far" in denying a landowner 
the benefit of her pr~perty.~ In applying this rule, the Court 
has recognized three categories of regulation: (a) regulations 
that impose a permanent physical invasion, (b) regulations that 
deny an owner all economically viable use of her land, and (c) 
regulations that affect a property's value, but fall short of com- 
pletely extinguishing the property's commercial value. When a 
regulation fits into categories (a) or (b) the Court will find a 
violation of the Takings Clause. In contrast, regulations that fit 
into category (c) are seldom deemed to  violate the prohibition 
against governmental takings. 
The rule for each category of regulation can be summarized 
as follows: 
(a) Land-use regulations that compel the property owner to 
suffer a permanent physical invasion, no matter how inconse- 
quential, violate the Takings Clause.' 
(b) Land-use regulations that deny the property owner all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land violate the 
Takings Clau~e .~  To fit into this category, a regulation must 
deprive the property owner of any residual value.g 
(c) Land-use regulations that fall short of completely extin- 
guishing a property's value probably do not violate the Takings 
Clause.'' Nevertheless, the Court has suggested that a viola- 
tion could be found by examining the economic impact of the 
regulation, the extent to  which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the nature of 
the governmental regulation." 
5 .  See infra part III.B.l. 
6. See infra parts IIIA-B.1. 
7. See infra part III.B.l(a). 
8. See infra part III.B.l(b). 
9. Id. 
10. See infra part III.B.l(c). 
11. Id. 
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2. Governmental actions that fail to substantially advance 
legitimate state interests l2 
The modern Court has confined this second analysis to 
examination of governmental development exactions.13 The 
Court examines a development exaction to determine whether 
the purpose behind the exaction substantially advances legiti- 
mate state interests. 
In approaching development exactions the Court asks three 
questions. First, does the state have the power to withhold 
issuance of the development permit altogether? If not, then the 
state cannot demand the exaction as a condition to issuance of 
the permit. Second, does an "essential news" exist between the 
legitimate state interest and the permit requirement? The 
exact "fit" necessary to meet the essential-nexus requirement 
has not yet been clearly articulated. Third, is the degree of the 
exaction "roughly proportional" to the projected impact of the 
proposed development? To satisfy the "rough proportionality7' 
requirement the government must have made an individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 
B. The Utah Supreme Court's Takings Analysis Under Article 
I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
In an inverse condemnation action against the State of 
Utah, three elements must be satisfied before a private proper- 
ty owner can recover just compensation under article I, section 
22 of the Utah Constitution.14 First, the property interest al- 
leged to have been taken or damaged must be a recognized 
interest in real property.15 Recognized property interests "in- 
clude[], but [are] not limited to any land and improvements 
subject to the substantive law of real property."16 Second, the 
12. See infia part III.B.2. 
13. "Development exactions are a form of land-use regulation in which a mu- 
nicipality requires a developer to give something to the community as a condition 
to receiving permission to develop." Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach, 
Please!": Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitu- 
tional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 823 (1989) (citing 
Donald L. C o ~ o r s  & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From 
Dedication ta Lidage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. BOBS. 69, 70 (1987)). 
14. See infia part N.B. 
15. See infia part N.B.1. 
16. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 
(Utah 1990) (citing 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.45 (3d ed. 1990)). 
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existence of a taking or damage must be confirmed by the 
court.17 A "taking" is any state interference which reduces a 
property's value or which substantially abridges the owner's 
right to the enjoyment thereof. A "damaging" is any type of 
state-initiated "permanent or recurring interference with prop- 
erty rights."18 Third, the alleged taking or damaging must 
have been occasioned by the state for a legitimate public 
use.lg If the alleged taking or damage is a result of negligence, 
or not intended for the public benefit, i t  will not be compensa- 
ble under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
111. THE FEDERAL TAKINGS ANALYSIS: ECONOMIC IMPACT AND 
LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS 
"[Plrivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, with- 
out just  omp pens at ion."^^ At first glance, interpretation of this 
constitutional command appears to be straightforward. By its 
terms, this clause requires the payment of "just compensation" 
whenever government appropriates or acquires an individual's 
private property for the benefit of the Such a simple 
characterization, however, belies the difficulties the Supreme 
Court has faced in its struggle to articulate a logically consis- 
tent interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 
The root of the Court's struggle originates in its review of 
two interrelated powers: the eminent domain power and the 
police power. These two powers share an important similarity: 
whenever either is exercised by a state or municipal govern- 
ment, it  is always done for the benefit of the general public. 
However, these two powers also have a distinct difference. By 
definition, any exercise of the eminent domain power includes 
the payment of just compensation for the private property tak- 
en.22 An exercise of the police power, on the other hand, sel- 
17. See infia part N.B.2. 
18. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990). 
19. See infia part N.B.3. 
20. U.S. C o ~ s r .  amend. V. 
21. See, e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 
381, 384 (N.Y.) ("[Wlhen the State 'takes', that is appropriates, private property for 
public use, just compensation must be paid. In contrast, when there is only regula- 
tion of the uses of private property, no compensation need be paid."), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 990 (1976). 
22. Black's Law Dictionary defines eminent domain as 
[tlhe power to take private property for public use by the state, munici- 
palities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise func- 
tions of public character. . . . However, the Constitution limits the power 
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dom requires that the government compensate those directly 
restricted by the reg~lation. '~ This difference presents state 
and municipal governments with a temptation that is difficult 
to resist because much of what a government entity can accom- 
plish affmatively through the eminent domain power can also 
be accomplished negatively through the police power." In the 
absence of a suitable restraint, governments could achieve 
eminent domain goals at no cost through a simple exercise of 
the police power. The modern federal takings analysis provides 
such a restraint. 
The early Supreme Court failed to recognize that regulato- 
ry exercises of the police power could amount to a de facto 
exercise of the eminent domain power. In a long line of cases 
which implicated Takings Clause the Court routinely 
to taking for a public purpose and prohibits the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain without just compensation to the owners of the property 
which is taken. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979); see also US. C o ~ s r .  amend. V. 
23. See, cg., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) ("It is 
an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If 
this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact 
that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render i t  uncon- 
stitutional [or require compensation]." (citations omitted)); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (The police power is "one of the most essential powers of 
government, one that is the least limitable. I t  may, indeed, seem harsh in its ex- 
ercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence 
precludes any limitation upon i t  when not exerted arbitrarily."); see also P e ~ s y l v a -  
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922): nia 
Id. 
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the 
police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, 
in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without 
making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, 
safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking [requiring com- 
pensation]. 
at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
24. Morosoff, supra note 13, explains that 
A municipality could do this by simply passing a regulation that forbids 
the property owner from asserting a traditionally recognized property 
interest. This is exactly what Pe~sy lvan ia  attempted to do in Pennsyl- 
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Rather than purchasing support rights from the 
coal companies, the state passed the Kohler Act which prohibited the 
companies from mining in such a way as to cause subsidence. This regu- 
lation effectively denied the companies all use of the support estate for 
which the companies had expressly contracted. 
Morosoff, supra note 13, at 832 n.76 (citation omitted, italics supplied). 
25. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kan- 
sas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
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sustained the state's use of its police power under a due pro- 
cess analysisz6 that ignored the dictates of the Takings 
Cla~se.~' Until Justice Holmes' landmark decision in Pennsyl- 
vania Coal Co. v. Mah~n?~ the Constitution's prohibition 
against taking went unrecognized as a valid check on the exer- 
cise of the police power. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes 
acknowledged "the natural tendency of human nature" to  ex- 
pand the operation of the police power "more and more until at 
last private property disappears.77zg By requiring compensation 
whenever a "regulation goes too far? Pennsylvania Coal for- 
ever changed the Court's Takings Clause analysis. 
The Supreme Court's modem application of the Takings 
Clause, which has evolved since Holmes' time, can be distilled 
into a two-pronged analysis that has its origins in early case 
law. The modern Court either expressly applies the Takings 
Clause and asks whether the regulation has gone "too far,"' 
or it follows a limited due process analysis that asks whether 
the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state inter- 
e ~ t . ~ ~  A brief review of the early developments in Supreme 
Court takings jurisprudence enhances one's understanding of 
the modern Court's two-pronged approach. 
A. Early Federal Takings Cases: 
The Roots of Modern Analysis 
When first confronted with early Takings Clause challeng- 
es, the Supreme Court avoided applying the actual language of 
the Takings Clause and instead examined the regulations using 
a due process analysis. Resort to this analysis consistently 
26. This due process analysis asked whether the regulation was a legitimate 
exercise of the state's police power, primarily examining whether the regulation 
protected a legitimate public purpose and whether the legislative means adequately 
advanced the public purpose. Justice Brandeis' forceful dissent in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon exemplifies this approach in the context of land-use regulation. 
260 U.S. 393, 417-18 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (The restriction upon the 
use of this property can not, of course, be lawfully imposed, unless its purpose is 
to  protect the public. . . . Furthermore, a restriction, though imposed for a public 
purpose, will not be lawful, unless the restriction is an appropriate means to the 
public end."). 
27. See infm part II1.A. 
28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
29. Id. at 415. 
30. Id. 
31. See infra part III.B.l. 
32. See infra part III.B.2. 
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favored government, upholding regulations that had a severe 
economic impact on individual landowners. 
For example, in Mugler v. Kansas,33 the State of Kansas 
enacted a prohibition that denied the defendants essentially all 
their properties' economically beneficial use.34 The Supreme 
Court first upheld the regulations as a valid exercise of the 
police power,35 and then rejected the idea that compensation 
was required when a land-use regulation denies an owner all 
beneficial use of her property.36 Later, in Hadacheck u. 
Seb~st ian,~ '  the Court again invoked a due process analysis 
and refused to grant relief to a property owner even though the 
property's value was substantially diminished by a municipal 
regulation. The Court reasoned that the regulation did not 
require compensation because the municipality had grounded 
its action in a rational exercise of the police power.38 The 
plaintiff had purchased property worth approximately 
$800,000.~~ Then the property's value was decreased to less 
than $60,000 when the City of Los Angeles placed the land in a 
33. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
34. Id. at  654-57. The statute in question declared "that the manufacture and 
sale of intoxicating liquors should be forever prohibited in [the] State." Id. at 655. 
Defendants owned breweries that had been manufacturing alcoholic beverages since 
before the statute was adopted, and the Court recognized that because of this 
prohibition "the value of [defendants'] property will be very materially diminished." 
Id. at 657. 
35. Id. at  660-62. The Court found that the statute was a legitimate exercise 
of the state's police power to protect "the public health, the public morals, and the 
public safety" and that it was "fairly adapted* to a legitimate public purpose. Id. 
at  662. 
36. Id. at 664. The Court stated: 
[Tlhe present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the 
power of eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be 
taken for public use without compensation. A prohibition simply upon the 
use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be 
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in 
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for 
the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the 
control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to 
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any 
one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public inter- 
ests. . . . The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property 
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a partic- 
ular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from 
taking property for public use . . . . 
Id. at 668-69. 
37. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
38. Id. at 407-10. 
39. Id. at 405. 
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limited-use district.40 Despite this enormous loss of value, the 
Court denied relief:' reasoning that the regulation was a val- 
id exercise of the police power and, as such, did not require 
c~mpensa t ion .~~ 
In these early cases the Court simply assumed that the 
Takings Clause was not qualified to restrain an exercise of the 
police power. With the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
u. M~hon :~  however, the Court began to breathe life into the 
Takings Clause. In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company had sold 
the plaintiffs a surface estate while expressly retaining the 
right to mine the coal beneath the surface." Plaintiffs had 
purchased the property with an understanding that the under- 
ground coal mining might cause subsidence damage to their 
surface estate.45 Then, Pennsylvania adopted legislation that 
prohibited the mining of coal if such mining would cause sur- 
face collapse or damage:6 and plaintiffs sued to prevent the 
coal company from mining below their property, alleging that 
"whatever may have been the Coal Company's rights, they 
were taken away by [the Pennsylvania law.]"47 
For the first time, the Court gave heed to the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition against taking. Justice Holmes recog- 
nized that the statute "destroy[ed] previously existing rights of 
property," then queried "whether the police power [could] be 
stretched so far."48 Believing. that a state's power to infringe 
- - - 
40. Id. at 404-05. 
41. Id. at 408-09. 
42. Id. at 409-10, 413-14. The Court found no merit in the property owner's 
claim. Concerning the municipality's exercise of the police power, the Court rea- 
soned: 
Id. 
I t  is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essen- 
tial powers of government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, 
seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the impera- 
tive necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not 
exerted arbitrarily. . . . There must be progress, and if in its march pri- 
vate interests are in the way they must yield t o  the good of the commu- 
nity . 
at 410. 
43. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
44. Id. at 412. 
45. Id. ("The deed conveys the surface, but in express terms reserves the 
right to remove all the coal uhder the same, and the &tee takes the premises 
with the risk, and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out 
the coal."). 
46. Id. at 412-13. 
47. Id. at 412. 
48. Id. at 413. 
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on property rights through regulation "must have its limits,"4g 
Justice Holmes invoked a constitutional restraint on the exer- 
cise of the police power by citing the constitutional requirement 
that government pay just compensation when diminution of 
property value "reaches a certain magnitude."50 He articulated 
a simple test: "The general rule at least is, that while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking."51 This test is not a bright- 
line rule. It was designed to engender a factual analysis which 
would scrutinize all of the relevant factors before determining 
whether a regulation had gone "too far."52 
The modem two-pronged Takings Clause analysis has 
grown from the decision in Pennsylvania Coal. The prong most 
commonly relied upon is nothing more than an attempt to de- 
termine whether, as Justice Holmes expressed it, the regula- 
tion in question has gone too far." The numerous cases per- 
forming this factual examination have begotten multiple factors 
that are more or less important depending upon the factual 
scenario involved. Nevertheless, the economic diminution prong 
49. Justice Holmes explained the problem as follows: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to prop- 
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an im- 
plied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the 
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process 
clauses are gone. 
Id. 
50. Id. ("One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of 
the diminution [in value]. When [the diminution] reaches a certain magnitude, in 
most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensa- 
tion to  sustain the act."). 
51. Id. at 415. 
52. "[Tlhe question depends upon the particular fads. The greatest weight is 
given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to interested parties 
to contend that the legislatu,re has gone beyond its constitutional power." Id. at  
413. Subsequent courts have recognized the ad hoc nature of this approach. See 
infi-a part III.B.l. 
53. Professor Michelman has some provocative thoughts on this point. He 
examined the current state of takings jurisprudence in 1987 and asked: "Wlhat 
makes a regulatory restriction on the use or disposition of property become a tak- 
ing for which just compensation is required by mandate of the United States Con- 
stitution"? Michelman Takings, supra note 3, at 1600-01. ARer noting that the 
myriad of Takings Clause interpretations have failed to produce a simple, abstract 
rule of law, he concludes that this lack of any definite rule of law is a healthy re- 
sult of the judicial process. Id. at  1625-29 (This result "is not law's antithesis but 
a part of law's essence."). Cf. Kmiec, supra note 3, a t  1630-31 (disagreeing with 
Professor Michelman's interpretation of the 1987 takings cases and attempting to 
answer "the question the Court avoids: when does a regulatory taking occur?"). 
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has not outgrown the simple test envisioned by Justice Holmes: 
the diminution in economic value gauges whether the exercise 
of police power has gone too fars4 Economic diminution is the 
most common analysis employed to  determine if a compensable 
taking has occurred, and is free fkom the earlier Court's sub- 
stantive due process examination of the government's exercise 
of the police power. However, the early Court's substantive due 
process analysis has not been entirely abandoned. The second 
prong of modem Takings Clause analysis examines whether 
the governmental action substantially advances legitimate 
state interests. The application of this prong has been con- 
strained to the narrow factual scenario of development exac- 
tions. 
B. The Modern Court's Analysis 
The modem Supreme Court's Takings Clause analysis 
follows a two-pronged approach. In reviewing governmental 
actions which trespass on individual property interests, the 
Supreme Court will find a violation of the Takings Clause if 
the government action (1) "denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land," or (2) "does not substantially advance legiti- 
mate state  interest^."^^ These two prongs are mutually exclu- 
sive; each is used to assess distinct factual  situation^.^^ The 
first is an outgrowth of Justice Holmes' fact-intensive general 
rule which gauges whether the government's exercise of its po- 
lice powers has gone too far by examining the property's dimi- 
nution in economic value.57 The other path of analysis is a 
remainder of the Court's substantive due process examination 
of takings issues.58 This second path scrutinizes the 
54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
55. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 11.36 (1978), for the first prong 
and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), for the second prong). 
Since &ins, the modern Court has frequently cited this passage as the general 
rule for regulatory takings issues. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 
(1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992); 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Ritumi- 
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedidis, 480 US. 470, 485 (1987). 
56. These analyses are rooted in the early takings decisions of the Supreme 
Court. For an overview of the influence these early decisions have had on modem 
takings analysis, see supra part IIIA. 
57. For a more detailed explanation of Justice Holmes' Pennsylvania Coal 
dkcision, see supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. 
58. For a "genealogy of the two principal competing discourses of Supreme 
904 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REYIEW [I994 
government's exercise of its police power more directly, striking 
it down if it does not substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest. The modern Court has only resorted to  this analysis 
when a municipality has denied a land-use permit for failure to 
comply with a specific development e~action.~' . 
This Comment will first examine the modern Court's at- 
tempt to delineate how far is "too far." This is the path of anal- 
ysis that was begat by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal.60 
Next, the Court's substantive due process analysis will be ex- 
amined? This alternate path of analysis furthers Takings 
Clause objectives by limiting a government's ability to exercise 
its police power in the area of development exactions. 
1. How far is too far? When regulation denies an owner eco- 
nomically viable use of the land 
Most modern Takings Clause cases are analyzed under the 
economic viability prong. When Justice Holmes stated that "if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking,"6z he 
stated a test that is ill-suited to bright-line  distinction^.^^ In- 
deed, he anticipated an analysis that would examine the facts 
of a particular case,64 especially the extent to  which the gov- 
ernment regulation diminishes a property's economic value,B5 
in determining whether the government's land-use regulation 
violates the Takings Clause.66 The modern Supreme Court 
Court land use planning jurisprudence," see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Dis- 
course, Social Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: Thc! Ge- 
nealogy of the Lochnerian Recurmnce in First English Lutheran Church and 
Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 427, 428 (1988). According to Professor Williams, the 
two competing discourses are: "[Tlhe discourse of aggressive judicial review of po- 
lice power regulations grounded in the Lochner era social vision of property as a 
fbndamental right, and the discourse of judicial deference grounded in the New 
Deal social vision that rejected judicial intervention in the socioeconomic field." Id. 
at  428-29 (footnotes omitted); see also supra notes 25-27, 33-? and accompanying 
text. 
59. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. a t  2309; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825. 
60. See supra part 1II.A. 
61. See infra part III.B.2. 
62. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393, 415 (1922). 
63. In Justice Holmes' words, this analysis is "a question of degree-and 
therefore c a ~ o t  be disposed of by general propositions." Id. at 416. 
64. Id. at 413 ("[Tlhe question depends upon the particular facts."). 
65. Id. ("One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of 
the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases 
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the 
act."). 
66. Id. at 413-16. 
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routinely relies upon Justice Holmes' reasoning as the founda- 
tion of its analysis under this prong. 
The many cases that have relied on the economic diminu- 
tion analysis have generated numerous factors that gauge the 
extent of the property's diminution in value. In fact, the analy- 
sis is so case-sensitive that the Court has characterized it as an 
"essentially ad hoe, factual inquirly] .'*' Despite the numerous 
factors that have been articulated over the years that might aid 
the Court with its analysis, the Court will always find that a 
land-use regulation violates the Takings Clause and requires 
compensation in two narrow instances.68 A land-use regula- 
tion violates the Takings Clause only when it either "compel[s] 
the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his proper- 
t ~ ' ' ~ '  or when it "denies all economically beneficial or produc- 
tive use of land.'"' Regulations that only partially diminish a 
67. Penn Central Tramp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(quoting Goldblatt v. City of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)); see also Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (acknowledging 
that, "[olrdinarily, the Court must engage in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."). 
The Lucas Court explained: 
[Olur decision in Mahon offered little insight into when, and under what 
circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going "too far" for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of succeeding "regula- 
tory takings" jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any "set formula" 
for determining how far is too far, preferring to "engagle] in . . . essen- 
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries." 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). This ad hoc 
approach has-not surprisingly-sometimes produced inconsistent results. Compare 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (finding that a state statute 
which prohibited the mining of coal below inhabited land violated the requirements 
of the Takings Clause), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470 (1987) (analyzing a factual scenario remarkably similar to that presented 
in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found that a state statute which prohibited the 
mining of coal below inhabited land did not violate the requirements of the Tak- 
ings Clause). 
68. In a recent case the Court expressly acknowledged its practice of requir- 
ing compensation in only two limited situations. In Justice Scalia's words, the 
Court has 
described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compen- 
sable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in 
support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel 
the property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. . . . 
The second situation in which [the Court has] found categorical treatment 
appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or pro- 
ductive use of land. 
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. a t  2893 (citations omitted). 
69. Id.; see also Loretto, 458 U.S. a t  419; see infia part III.B.l(a). 
70. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; see infia part III.B.l(b). 
906 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
property's value, no matter how substantial the diminution, 
have never been held to require c~mpensation.~' 
When confronted with a regulation that denies an owner 
economically viable use of the l i d ,  determine into which cate- 
gory the regulation best fits: (a) does the regulation impose an 
actual physical invasion of property? (b) does the regulation 
deny the owner all economically beneficial or productive use of 
the land? or (c) does the regulation only partially diminish the 
property's value? Constitutionality will depend on which cate- 
gory best contains the regulation in question. If the regulation 
falls into category (a) or (6) it is unconstitutional and requires 
compensation. But, if it falls into category (c) the regulation 
has not risen to the level of a constitutional violation under the 
Takings Clause. 
(a) Regulations that impose an actual physical invasion of 
property. Whenever government regulation compels a property 
owner to  suffer actual physical invasion of property, "no matter 
how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the 
public purpose behind it,"72 the Court has ' ' in~ar iabl~~fo~nd a 
taking."73 
The modern case that best represents this rule is Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV C ~ r p . ~ *  In Loretto, the State 
of New York enacted legislation "[tlo facilitate tenant access t o  
[cable televi~ion]."~~ The law "provide[d] that a landlord 
[could] not 'interfere with the installation of cable television 
facilities upon his property.'"76 A landlord brought suit 
against a cable television company that had installed cables on 
the landlord's building, alleging that the company's installation 
of cable under the provisions of the act was "a taking without 
just ~om~ensation."'~ The Court ruled in favor of the landlord, 
71. See infia part III.B.l(c). 
72. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at  2890 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at  426). Cf. Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (holding that the imposition of 
navigational servitude on a marina created and rendered navigable at private ex- 
pense constituted a taking). 
73. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427. 
74. 458 US. 419 (1982). 
75. Id. at 423. According to the New York Court of Appeals, this legislation 
served "the legitimate public purpose of 'rapid development of . . . a means of 
communication which has important educational and community aspects.'" Id. at  
425 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 329 
(N.Y. 1981) (reu'd, 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). 
76. Id. at 423 (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994)). 
77. Id. at 424. 
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concluding that a permanent physical occupation, no matter 
how minor," constituted a taking of property for which just 
compensation was due.7g The government's interest in this 
regulation was of little weight in  the analysis. As the Loretto 
Court explained, any "permanent physical occupation autho- 
rized by government is a taking without regard to the public 
interests that [the regulation] may serve."80 
(6) Regulations that deny the owner all economically bene- 
ficial or productive use of the land. As with regulations causing 
a physical occupation, regulations that deprive an owner of all 
economically beneficial use of a property are subject to a sub- 
stantially predictable guideline. Whenever a land-use regula- 
tion is seen as effectively denying a landowner all economically 
beneficial or productive use of her p r~per ty ,~ '  the Court has 
consistently found a taking and required   om pens at ion.^^ 
78. This was, by all accounts, a very minor physical intrusion. The cable com- 
pany "installed a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and of approxi- 
mately 30 feet in length along the length of the building . . . and directional taps, 
approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof." 
Id. at  422 (quoting Loretto, 423 N.E.2d a t  324). 
79. Id. at  426 (We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized 
by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve. 
Our constitutional history confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and 
the purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention."). 
80. Id. 
81. The Court has described these occurrences as "relatively rare situations" 
and as "extraordinary circumstance[s]." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992). If the Court determines that the regulation does not 
effect a complete denial of all eco~omically beneficial or productive use, then the 
Court will apply a different analysis. For the analysis applicable to situations in 
which the regulation leaves the property with some value, see infia part III.B.l.(c). 
82. Notice that the Court has the final say in determining whether a regu- 
lation has in fact denied a landowner of all economically beneficial or productive 
use-an inherently qualitative determination. Many landowners have sought relief 
under the Takings Clause only to be denied because, in the Court's view, the regu- 
lation did not completely extinguish a hndamental attribute of ownership, leaving 
the landowner something more than nothing. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also 
infra part 1II.B. l(c). 
In Lucas, the Supreme Court acknowledged this problem of subjectivity, recog- 
nized that it had sometimes led to inconsistent results, but declined to resolve the 
issue on the facts of that case. The Court explained: 
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically 
feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not 
make clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be 
measured. . . . Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition 
of the denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has produced inconsistent 
[results]. The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's 
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The modern case that best represents this proposition is 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Cornmissi~n.'~ In Lucas, a 
developer had purchased two shorefront lots on a barrier island 
with plans to construct single-family houses on the 10ts.'~ The 
properties were not subject to the state's coastal regulations at 
the time of p~rchase. '~ However, two years later the state leg- 
islature enacted the Beachfront Management which 
barred the developer from erecting any permanent habitable 
structures on the lots.'? The developer "promptly filed suit . . . 
contending that the . . . Act's construction bar effected a taking 
of his property without just compensation.'"' The trial court 
found that the Act "decreed a permanent ban on construction 
insofar as [the developer's] lots were concerned, and that this 
prohibition 'deprive[d the developer] of any reasonable econom- 
ic use of the lots, . . . and renderred] them ~alueless.""~ The 
trial court then "concluded that [the developer's] properties had 
been 'taken' by operation of the Act, and it ordered [the state] 
to pay 'just cornpensati~n."~~ The state supreme court re- 
versed, resorting to an analysis reminiscent of the early Court's 
takings  decision^.^^ Deferring to the state legislature's "uncon- 
tested findings" that new construction threatened the public 
shoreline res0urces,9~ the state supreme court ruled that when 
a regulation is designed to "prevent serious public harmY3 
reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of proper- 
ty-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal 
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect 
to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) 
value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present case . . . . 
112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (citations omitted). 
83. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
84. Id. at 2889. The developer paid $975,000 for the lots. Id. 
85. Id. at 2890. 
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). 
87. Lucas, 122 S. Ct. a t  2889. 
88. Id. at 2890. The petitioner "did not take issue with the validity of the 
Act as a lawful exercise of [the state's] police power, but contended that the Act's 
complete extinguishment of his property's value entitled him to compensation re- 
gardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of legitimate police 
power objectives." Id. 
89. Id. at 2890 (citations omitted). 
90. Id. (citations omitted). 
91. See supra part IIIA. 
92. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991). 
93. Id. at  899 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)). 
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"no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless 
of the regulation's effect on the property's value."94 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
recognizing the general rule that "where regulation denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land,"95 compensa- 
tion is required "without case-specific inquiry into the public 
interest advanced in support of the re~tra int ."~~ The Court 
cited numerous cases to support this general rule:' but can- 
didly recognized that it has "never set forth the justification for 
this rule."g8 Then, after discussing several possible justifica- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~  the Court bluntly concluded that "there are good rea- 
sons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of 
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically 
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to 
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a tak- 
ing.''' O0 
The Court then engaged in a lengthy attempt to clarify its 
holding (and this general rule) in light of its numerous prior 
 opinion^'^' which suggest "that 'harmful or noxious uses' of 
property may be proscribed by government regulation without 
the requirement of compen~ation."'~~ 
94. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890 (quoting Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899). 
95. Id. at 2893. 
96. Id. (citations omitted). 
97. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel 
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981); 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
98. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894. 
99. The Court begins by stating that "perhapsn the rule exists because "total 
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent 
of a physical appropriation." Id. (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San 
Diego, 450 US.  621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The Court then advanc- 
es a second justification: "regulations that leave the owner of land without econom- 
ically beneficial or productive options for its use . . . carry with them a heightened 
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under 
the guise of mitigating serious public harm." Id. at  2894-95. The Court continued, 
explaining that "[tlhe many statutes on the books . . . that provide for the use of 
eminent domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands preventing develop- 
mental uses . . . suggest the practical equivalence in this setting of negative regu- 
lation and appropriation." Id. at  2895. 
100. Id. at  2895 (emphasis in original). 
101. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. 
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). For a discussion of the trend established in these 
cases, see supra part 111. 
102. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. The Court characterizes its "'harmful or nox- 
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Although this general rule might seem impenetrable, 
Lucas recognized one potentially significant exception: "Where 
the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensa- 
tion only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of 
the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were 
not part of his [or her] title to begin with."lo3 In other words, 
a state can avoid this general rule requiring compensation by 
demonstrating that the property owner's bundle of rights did 
not include the property interest impaired by the regulation. To 
determine which rights are included in the proverbial "bundle" 
and which are not, the Court defers to the '%ackground princi- 
ples of the State's law of property and nuisance already. . . 
upon land ownership" when property is p ~ r c h a s e d . ' ~ ~  In other 
words, government can still regulate away all economically 
beneficial use of land if it  can show that "it was possible to 
prohibit this use under the state's existing property law."lo5 
ious use' analysis" as an "early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why gov- 
ernment may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regula- 
tion without incurring an obligation to compensate." Id. at  2897. The Court sub- 
stantially impairs the vitality of its "harmful or noxious use" logic as a means for 
identifying regulatory takings that require compensation, id. at  2898-99, by boxing 
it into a substantive due process analysis. The Court states: "'Harmful or noxious 
use' analysis was . . . simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements 
that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advance[sl legit- 
imate state interests.'" Id. at  2897 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. a t  834). See infra 
part III.B.2. In other words, "'prevention of harmful use' was merely [the Court's] 
early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without 
compensation) any regulatory diminution in value." 112 S. Ct. at  2898-99. And 
since what constitutes a harmful use may be impossible to discern, "noxious-use 
logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory 'takings9-which require 
compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation. A 
fortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis 
for departing from [the] categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be com- 
pensated." Id. at 2899. 
103. Id. at 2898. 
104. Id. at  2900-02. 
105. The Court's precise approach to this exception is expressed as follows: 
Where "permanent physical occupation" of land is concerned, we have re- 
fused to allow the government to decree it anew (without compensation), 
no matter how weighty the asserted "public interests" involved-though 
we assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent ease- 
ment that was a preexisting limitation upon the landowner's title. We be- 
lieve similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e., 
regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: Any limi- 
tation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensa- 
tion), but must inhere in the title itself, in the rixtridions that back- 
ground of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon 
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(c) Regulations that fall short of completely extinguishing 
a property's value. If the regulation falls short of completely ex- 
tinguishing a property's value, the landowner's chances of re- 
coveri~g compensation are slim. Only regulations that amount 
to  a permanent physical invasion of property or deprive the 
owner of all economic value have been found to  require com- 
pensation. Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has regularly 
threatened to  find a taking in this category, but it has never 
required compensation unless the regulation deprived the prop- 
erty of all economic value.'06 Of course, the Court may one 
day sharpen the teeth of this less-than-total-deprivation analy- 
sis.'" Therefore, the factors that the Court has examined and 
applied in analyzing regulations that deprive the landowner of 
less than all beneficial use may profitably be reviewed. Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City'" identifies 
these factors. 
In Penn Central, the City of New York enacted an ordi- 
nance designed to  "protect [its] historic landmarks and neigh- 
borhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamentally 
alter their chara~ter."'~~ The city believed that its "'stand- 
ing. . . as a world-wide tourist center and world capital of 
business, culture and government' would be threatened" with- 
out this ordinance. ' lo ''The primary responsibility for admin- 
land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other 
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been 
achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected 
persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under 
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public gener- 
ally, or otherwise. 
Id. at 2900 (citations omitted). 
106. For an overview of the Court's approach to regulations that deny all eco- 
nomically viable use of land, see supra part III.B.l(b). 
107. In Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old 
Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1989), Professor Wilkins suggests 
that the Court could give the Takings Clause an appropriate bite by consistently 
applying the three factors enumerated in P ~ M  Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See infia notes 109-128 and accompanying text. 
108. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
109. Id. at 109. 
110. Id. 
The city believed that comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable fea- 
tures of the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens in a variety of 
ways: e.g., fostering "civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments 
of the past"; protecting and enhancing "the city's attractions to tourists 
and visitors"; "support[ing] and stimul[ating] business and industry"; 
"strengthen[ing] the economy of the city"; and promoting "the use of his- 
912 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
istering the ordinance [was] vested in the Landmarks Preserva- 
tion Commission.""' Acting pursuant to its authority under 
the ordinance, "the Commission designated [Grand Central] 
Terminal a 'landmark"' property.ll2 Under the provisions of 
the ordinance, the owners of a landmark property were re- 
quired to obtain permission from the commission before alter- 
ing the exterior of the property.ll3 The owner of Grand Cen- 
tral Terminal, a corporation that opposed the landmark desig- 
nation but "did not seek judicial review of the final designation 
decision" as authorized under the landmarks law, entered a 
lease agreement whereby the lessee would "construct a multi- 
story office building [in the space] above the Terminal."114 
The owner and lessee then sought the Commission's approval 
for the contemplated construction as required under the land- 
mark ordinance.ll5 Two different plans for construction of the 
proposed office building above the terminal, both of which sat- 
isfied the applicable zoning ordinances, were deemed unaccept- 
able by the Cornmi~sion."~ The owner of the terminal and 
the lessee brought suit claiming that application of New York 
toric districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks for 
the education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the city." 
Id. (alterations in original). 
111. Id. at 110. 
112. Id. at 115. Properties were to be given "landmark" status if the Commis- 
sion determined that the properties had "a special character or special historical or 
aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural charac- 
teristics of the city, state or nation." Id. at  110. 
113. Specifically, the law imposed two restrictions on the owner of landmark 
property: 
Id. 
First, the law imposes a duty upon the owner to keep the exterior fea- 
tures of the building "in good repair" to assure that the law's objectives 
not be defeated by the landmark's falling into a state of irremediable 
disrepair. Second, the Commission must approve in advance any proposal 
to alter the exterior architectural features of the landmark or to construct 
any exterior improvement on the landmark site, thus ensuring that deci- 
sions concerning construction on the landmark site are made with due 
consideration of both the public interest in the maintenance of the struc- 
ture and the landowner's interest in use of the property. 
at 112. 
114. Id. at 116. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at  116-18. One of the plans was rejected because it involved "tearing 
down a portion of the Terminal [ i d ]  stripping off" some of its features. Id. at  
116-17. The other plan, which involved cantilevering a 55-story building above the 
Terminal's facade and resting it on the Terminal's roof, was rejected because such 
a massive building would destroy one view of the site and would be aesthetically 
inconsistent with the Terminal's architectural style. Id. at  116-18. 
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City's landmarks law had "taken" private property without just 
compensation. ' " 
The Supreme Court ruled that designating the Grand Cen- 
tral Terminal as a landmark property and subjecting it to New 
York City's landmarks law did not amount t o  a taking.'18 To 
reach this holding, the Court "review[ed] the factors that have 
shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment injunction 
[against takings without just compensation]""g and articulat- 
ed three fa~tors''~ for determining when a regulation 
amounts to a taking:''' (1) "[tlhe economic impact of the regu- 
lation on the claimant," (2) "the extent to  which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," 
and (3) "the character of the governmental action."lp After 
articulating these factors, the Court assessed the appellant's 
takings claim and refused to find a taking for several rea- 
s o n ~ . ' ~  First, the law did not interfere with the building's 
present uses, but allowed the owner to continue using it as had 
been done in the past. In the Court's judgment, this permitted 
the owner to "obtain a 'reasonable return' on its invest- 
ment? Second, the law did not necessarily prohibit occu- 
pancy of any of the air space above the landmark building, 
since it was possible that construction in the air space might be 
allowed in the future? Third, the law did not deny all use of 
the owner's pre-existing air right above the landmark building, 
since under a transferable rights program, the owner could 
117. Id. at  119. 
118. Id. at  138. 
119. Id. at  123. 
120. The Court characterized these factors as having "particular significance." 
Id. at 124. For a comprehensive overview and analysis of these three factors, see 
Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme 
Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339-51 (1988). 
121. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. a t  124. Before articulating these fac- 
tors, the Court noted: 
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable dificulty. . . . 
Indeed, [the Court has] frequently observed that whether a particular 
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for 
any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the particular 
circumstances [in that] case." 
Id. at  123-24 (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 
168 (1958)). 
122. Id. at  124 (citation omitted). 
123. Id. at  128-138. 
124. Id. at 136. 
125. Id. at  136-37. 
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transfer the development rights it was foreclosed from using at 
Grand Central Terminal to its other neighboring proper- 
ties. 12' 
The factors presented in Penn Central for determining 
whether a regulation that only partially diminishes the 
property's value amounts to a taking rarely lead to the con- 
clusion that a taking has occurred.127 As a practical matter, a 
regulation must deprive an owner of all economically beneficial 
use of the land or a violation of the Takings Clause will not be 
found. 12'
2. The police power limit: governmental development exactions 
that do not substantially advance legitimate state interests 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has also examined a 
narrow species of Takings Clause challenges using a substan- 
tive due process analysis. Instead of asking whether the 
government's action has gone too far, the Court has examined 
whether the governmental action substantially advances the 
state interest.12' This substantive due process analysis is ap- 
plied to the narrow circumstance in which a state or municipal 
government has conditioned the grant of a land-use permit 
upon the dedication of a specific property interest. Such a con- 
dition is called a "development exaction" because the govern- 
ment is exacting something in  return for allowing develop- 
ment? In two recent development exactions cases, Nollan v. 
126. Id. at 137. 
127. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987). 
128. See supra part III.B.l(b). 
129. The Court's return to a substantive due process analysis has been sharply 
criticized as an unnecessary revival of a discredited approach to judicial analysis. 
See, e.g., Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 S.U. L. 
REV. 627 (1988); David A. Myers, Some Observations on the Analysis of Regulatory 
Takings in the Rehnquist Court, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 527 (1989); Wilkins, supra 
note 107, at 3-4 ("The wisdom of testing legislative or administrative action against 
a rigorous 'meandends' standard, however, is questionable. Such an approach 
proved unmanageable and unwise in the heyday of 'substantive due process,' and 
there is little reason to think the methodology will prove more workable--or justifi- 
able-in the context of the takings clause."). 
130. See, e.g., Morosoff, supra note 13, a t  823 ("Development exactions are a 
form of land-use regulation in which a municipality requires a developer to give 
something t o  the community as a condition to receiving permission to develop.") 
(citing Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, m e  Expanding Circle of Exactions: 
From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (1987)). 
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California Coastal Commi~sion'~' and Dolan v. City of 
Tigard,ls2 the Court has used this substantive due process 
approach. In  both cases, the landowner prevailed; the 
governments' attempts to exact a permanent public easement 
by making the granting of the easement a condition for obtain- 
ing a development permit violated the Takings C l a u ~ e . ' ~  
In Nollan, the owners of a beachfront lot sought to tear 
down an old bungalow on the premises and replace it with a 
larger house.134 As required by state law, the owners applied 
to the California Coastal Commission for a building permit.ls5 
The Commission granted the building permit on condition that 
the owners give "the public an easement to pass across [the] 
portion of their property" which lay between the water and the 
house.'" The owners petitioned for a writ of administrative 
mandamus and obtained a permit over the Commission's deni- 
al.13' The Commission appealed.13' On appeal, the Supreme 
Court held the Commission's exaction violated the Takings 
Clause.'" A similar scenario occurred in Dolan. In that case, 
the owner of a local business wished to expand her store and 
pave her parking lot.140 The owner applied for the requisite 
building permit.l4' The City Planning Commission condi- 
tioned approval of the owner's construction upon the dedication 
of a portion of her property for a public greenway and for a 
131. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
132. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
133. For an  examination of how the Takings Clause can be interpreted to pro- 
tect property owners from the various "predatory municipal zoning practices," see 
Leigh & Burton, supra note 3, at 828. But cf. Vicki Been, *ExitM a s  a Constraint 
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 
COLIJM. L. REV. 473, 543-45 (1991) (arguing that the case for imposing legal con- 
straints-particularly as a matter of constitutional law-is weak because market 
forces can adequately constrain the conduct of municipalities). 
Professor Sterk has proposed several reasons why Professor Been's campaign to 
relax constitutional restraints in favor of market forces and economic restraints is 
misguided. Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on 
Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1992) (asserting that market forces are 
inadequate to eliminate the potential for municipal abuse of the exaction process). 
134. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28. 
135. Id. at  828. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. a t  828-29. 
138. Id. a t  829. 
139. Id. a t  841-42. 
140. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2311 (1994). 
141. Id. a t  2313. 
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public bicycle path.'42 Expanding upon the analysis estab- 
lished in Nollan, the Supreme Court held that the city's dedi- 
cation requirement constituted an uncompensated taking of 
property. lu 
An understanding of the Court's logic is necessary in order 
to fully appreciate the Court's analysis in these cases. That 
analysis is based on the assumption that the government has 
the power to withhold issuance of the permit altogether? 
The Court reasoned in Nollan as follows: "If a prohibition de- 
signed to accomplish [the city's] purpose would be a legitimate 
exercise of the police power rather than a taking, i t  would be 
strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to 
that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is 
not."145 Furthermore, "a permit condition that serves the 
same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the 
permit should not be found to be a taking."'46 Therefore, a 
taking should be found only if the condition's purpose differs 
from the legitimate police-power purpose for withholding the 
permit. 
In making this determination, the Court follows a two-step 
analysis. I t  first "determine[s] whether the 'essential nexus' 
exists between the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit 
condition exacted by the city.""' This primary inquiry exam- 
ines whether the state's articulated purpose for demanding 
fulfillment of the condition adequately relates to the actual 
demands of the condition. This is a necessary first inquiry 
because, "if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly 
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition," then "[tlhe evident constitutional propriety [aris- 
ing from the state's power to withhold the permit altogether] 
disappears."'" Nollan provides an illustration. In that case, 
the State Commission asserted an interest in (1) "protecting 
the public's ability to see the beach," (2) "assisting the public in 
142. Id. at 2314. 
143. Id. at 2316-22. 
144. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 836. 
147. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837). For a detailed 
examination of the Nollan Court's nexus requirement, see William A. Falik & Anna 
C. Shimko, The "Takings Nexus*-The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in 
Land-Use Planning: A View born California, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 359 (1988). 
148. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
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overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach treat- 
ed by a developed shorefront," and (3) "preventing congestion 
on the public beaches."14g The Court agreed, without deciding, 
that these are valid public purposes for which the Commission 
"unquestionably would be able to deny the [owners] their per- 
mit outright if their new house . . . would substantially impede 
these purposes."150 Despite the apparent validity of these pur- 
poses, however, the Court recognized that "unless the permit 
condition serves the same governmental purpose as the devel- 
opment ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of 
land use but 'an out-and-out plan of e~tortion.""~~ Then, 
without explaining "how close a 'fit' between the condition and 
the burden is required,"ls2 the Court held that  the 
Commission's "imposition of the permit condition cannot be 
treated as an exercise of its land-use power for any of [its as- 
serted public] The Court in Nollan thus did not 
149. Id. at  835. 
150. Id. at 835-36. After noting that the Court's "cases have not elaborated on 
the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest,'" but 
that "[tlhey have made clear that a broad range of governmental purposes and 
regulations satisfies these requirements," id. at 834-35, the Court addressed this 
initial question as follows: 
The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are pro- 
tecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in over- 
coming the "psychological barrier" to using the beach created by a devel- 
oped shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches. We 
assume, without deciding, that this is so-in which case the Commission 
unquestionably would be able to deny the [owners] their permit outright 
if their new house . . . would substantially impede these purposes . . . . 
Id. at  835-36. Citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978), the Court noted that a taking could still be found if the "denial would 
interfere so drastically with the [owner's] use of their property as to constitute a 
taking." Id. at 836. See supra part III.B.l(c). 
151. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 
12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)) (other citation omitted). 
152. Id. at 838. 
153. Id. at 839. The Nollan Court explained why it felt that the condition in 
that case did not adequately relate to the state's police power purposes. 
I t  is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people al- 
ready on the public beaches be able to walk across the prospective prop- 
erty reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new 
house. I t  is also impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychologi- 
cal barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any 
additional congestion on them caused by construction of the prospective 
new house. 
Id. at 838-42. 
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find the requisite nexus between the condition's demands and 
the state's purpose in making those demands.154 
When the Court does find the requisite nexus, the Court 
will proceed to the next inquiry: "whether the degree of the 
exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bear the 
required relationship to the projected impact of [the] proposed 
de~eloprnent."'~~ In Nollan, the Court never delineated what 
constituted the "required relationship" because the develop- 
ment exaction was invalidated under the fvst inquiry.156 The 
required relationship was, however, articulated in Dolan. In 
that case, the Court found that the essential nexus exists be- 
tween preventing flooding and congestion and requiring partial 
dedication of the owner's property for a public greenway and 
bicycle path.15? Turning to the second part of the analysis, 
the Court asked "whether the degree of the exactions demand- 
ed by the city's permit conditions [bore] the required relation- 
ship to the projected impact of [the owner's] proposed develop- 
ment."15' The Court approved of the intermediate position 
taken by many states that requires a "'reasonable relationship' 
between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed 
de~eloprnent."'~~ However, the Court declined to  adopt this 
reasonable relationship test "partly because the term 'reason- 
able relationship' seems confusingly similar to the term 'ratio- 
nal basis' which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment."160 Instead, the Court adopted a test of "rough propor- 
tionality."16' Under the rough proportionality test, "[nlo pre- 
cise mathematical calculation is required, but the [government] 
must make some sort of individualized determination that the 
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed de~elopment."'~~ 
154. See id. at 838-39. 
155. Dolan v. City ofi Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318 (1994) (citing Nollan, 483 
U.S. a t  834). 
156. Id. at 2317; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at  838-39. 
157. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. a t  2318. 
158. Id. (citing Nollan, 483 US. a t  834). 
159. Id. at 2319. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 2319-20. 
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IV. THE UTAH ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
A state's power of eminent domain is "[tlhe power to take pri- 
vate property for public use."'" In exercising this power, 
however, the state is required, by express constitutional com- 
mand, to pay "just compensation" for any private property it 
takes or damages for public use.'" The process of exercising 
the eminent domain power is commonly referred to as "condem- 
nation."'" In Utah, legislation has been adopted to guide the 
state's exercise of its eminent domain power in  condemnation 
 proceeding^.'^^ Utah's eminent domain statute establishes 
specific public uses for which the eminent domain power may 
be exercised.lB7 In addition, it identifies the types of private 
property that may be taken,'68 sets the conditions precedent 
to c~ndemnat ion, '~~ indicates how to assess compensa- 
tion,'" and generally outlines the details of condemnation 
pro~eedings.'~' 
If, however, the state takes private property without initi- 
ating a condemnation proceeding, the private property owner 
may initiate an "inverse condemnation" action against the 
state.'72 The Utah Supreme Court's analysis of inverse con- 
demnation claims is grounded in the requirements of article I, 
section 22 of the Utah Constitution. To understand the Utah 
court's application of article I, section 22, it is necessary to first 
163. BLACK'S LAW ' DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979). 
164. The Federal Constitution states: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Utah Con- 
stitution parallels the Federal Constitution in substantial part: "l?rivate property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH 
CONST. art. I, $ 22. Notice that the Utah Constitution expressly prohibits "taking" 
or "damaging" private property for public use without just compensation, while the 
Federal Constitution only expressly prohibits a "taking." 
165. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979). In a condemnation action, 
the state initiates a legal proceeding to determine the value of the property. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. $$ 78-34-1 to 78-34-20 (1992). 
166. See UTAH CODE ANN. $$ 78-34-1 to 78-34-20 (1992). 
167. Id. $ 78-34-1. 
168. Id. $ 78-34-3. 
169. Id. $ 78-34-4. 
170. Id. 9 78-34-10. 
171. Id. $8 78-34-6 to 78-34-16. 
172. Inverse condemnation is "[a] cause of action against a government agency 
t o  recover the value of property taken by the agency, though no formal exercise of 
the power of eminent domain has been completed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 
(5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted). 
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understand how, historically, confusion surrounding the doc- 
trine of sovereign immunity impeded the full application of 
Utah's takings clause. 
A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the Development 
of Utah's Takings Analysis 
In the earliest days of Utah's history, even before adoption 
of the Utah Constitution, the territorial court was sympathetic 
to individuals whose private property had been injured by the 
Ratification of the Utah Constitution in 1896 
raised this sentiment to the level of a constitutionally guaran- 
teed protection. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
provides, quite simply, that "[plrivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensa- 
t i ~ n . " ' ~ ~  By its express terms, the Utah clause would seem to 
provide more explicit protection than that provided by the Tak- 
ings Clause of the Fifth Arnend~nent, '~~ since the Utah clause 
requires compensation for both a "taking" and a "damaging" of 
private property. Ironically, rather than providing heightened 
protection, this distinction between taking and damaging re- 
tarded the development of takings protection in Utah. 
When the Utah Supreme Court began to distinguish claims 
that asserted a taking of property from those that asserted only 
a damaging, a property owner's remedies against the state 
under article I, section 22 for a taking or damaging of private 
property began to diminish.'" Eventually, in Holt v. Utah 
State Road Commi~sion, '~~ the court reached the conclusion 
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a private prop- 
erty owner from suing the state for a damaging of proper- 
ty.'?' The Holt court strictly construed the Utah Governmen- 
173. See, e.g., Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 33 P. 229 (Utah 
1893) (upholding an injunction that stopped construction of a third set of trolley 
tracks and electric poles along Dooly Block's lots, reasoning that the construction 
would seriously reduce the value of the property and was not necessary to provide 
public transportation). 
174. UTAH CONST. art. I, 8 22. 
175. The Takings Clause of the FiRh Amendment provides that "private prop- 
erty [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. For an examination of the Supreme Court's multifarious application of 
this clause, see supm parts I1 & 111. 
176. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Rd. Comm'n v. District Court, 78 P.2d 502, 
512-25 (Utah 1938) (Wolfe, J., dissenting) (arguing that damages and takings 
claims require separate procedural remedies). 
177. 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973). 
178. Id. a t  1288; see also Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 503 P.2d 144, 147 
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tal Immunity Act'?' "to preserve sovereign immunity," and 
concluded that "the State waived immunity only where clearly 
expres~ed." '~~ Since the state had not clearly waived its im- 
munity from suit in takings cases, the court concluded that 
even claims for just compensation based on article I, section 22 
of the Utah Constitution were pre~luded.'~' Until 1990, an  
individual property owner's ability to pursue an inverse con- 
demnation claim was severely limited by this sovereign immu- 
nity rationale.lg2 
Colman v. Utah State Land Boardlm dissolved the gov- 
ernmental immunity barrier to property damages claims. In  
this case, a landowner brought an inverse condemnation action 
alleging that the state's "destruction of his canal constitute[d] a 
taking of his property without just compensation in violation of 
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution."'* The state 
responded that it was immune from this inverse condemnation 
claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act?' After 
reviewing the history of article I, section 22 of the Utah Consti- 
tution, and noting that "the overwhelming majority of states 
with similar constitutional provisions hold them to be self-exe- 
cuting,"lg6 the court overruled thirty years of precedent and 
"reaffirm[ed] that article I, section 22 is self exe~uting." '~~ In 
so holding, the court recognized that property owners who 
(Utah 1972) (concluding that sovereign immunity precludes a landowner's suit for 
injunctive relief against state commissioners as long as the commissioners have 
acted within the scope of their authority); Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Comrn'n, 
445 P.2d 708, 709 (Utah 1968) (disallowing a damage claim to property on the 
grounds of sovereign immunity); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 P.2d 907, 908-09 (Utah 
1952) (concluding that in the absence of state consent, sovereign immunity barred 
actions by private property owners against the state or its employees for injury to 
property). But see Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1325-26 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (reasoning that substantial impairment of a right appurtenant to 
property ownership which causes substantial devaluation, though not sufficient to 
amount to a physical taking, warrants compensation). 
179. UTAH CODE ANN. $8 63-30-1 to 63-30-34 (1953) (the complete act is codi- 
fied at  UTAH CODE ANN. $8 63-30-1 to 63-30-38 (1993)). 
180. Justin T. Toth, Note, Colrnan v. Utah State Land Board: Searching for a 
Balanced Approach to "Takings" Under the Utah Constitution, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 
505, 511; see also Holt, 511 P.2d at  1288. 
181. Holt, 511 P.2d a t  1287-88. 
182. For a discussion of the case law that led to the Colman decision and an 
examination of the analysis in that case, see Toth, supra note 180, a t  505. 
183. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
184. Id. at 630. 
185. Id. 
186. For a list of these states, see id. at  632 n.2. 
187. Id. at  630. 
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suffer a taking or damaging of property have a constitutional 
right to sue the state to recover just compensation. Accordingly, 
the state's consent to suit through waiver of sovereign immuni- 
ty is no longer a prerequisite to recovering just compensation 
under article I, section 22 in Utah? 
B. The Utah Supreme Court's Modern Takings Analysis 
In  the Utah Supreme Court's most recent appli~ation''~ 
of article I, section 22, the court articulated three elements of 
an  inverse condemnation claim: Tor the purposes of [this] 
constitutional provision, an inverse condemnation action re- 
quires (1) property, (2) a taking or damages, and (3) a public 
use."1g0 This methodical approach logically incorporates prior 
precedent into an efficient three-element analysis. The sim- 
plicity of these three elements can mislead one into believing 
that the analysis is complete. As Justice Zimmerman observed, 
however, "the precise limits of a taking or damaging have yet 
to be carefully or consistently spelled out by this co~rt." '~' In- 
deed, all five justices agree that "a detailed picture of what 
constitutes a taking or damaging has not [yet] been painted by 
this court."192 Therefore, while these three elements provide a 
cle 
Id. 
188. The court frankly conceded that its old precedent had failed to give arti- 
I, section 22 its proper place in constitutional government. 
The history of these cases shows that for a time the Court's concentration 
on the doctrine of sovereign immunity caused it to neglect this constitu- 
tional provision, which was designed to protect individual rights. This 
elevation of legislation and common law principles over a clear constitu- 
tional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional government. The 
people of Utah established the Utah Constitution as a limitation on the 
power of government. It can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, alone among all doctrines, is outside of the limita- 
tions the people established. 
at  634-35. 
189. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 
1990). 
190. Id. at 1243-44. 
191. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 637 (Zimmerman, J., con- 
curring) (citing Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988)). Reversing a long line of precedent, Colman made a significant contri- 
bution to  the Ui.ah takings analysis by holding that article I, section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution was self-executing. Id. at 630; se2 supra notes 183-188 and ac- 
companying text. Justice Zimmerman remarked, however, that "[tlhere will be time 
enough for [the court] to  carefully consider [the precise limits of a taking or dam- 
aging] in future cases." Colman, 795 P.2d a t  637. 
192. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 701 (Utah 1990) 
(citing Colman, 795 P.2d at  625-31). 
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concise analysis, the court has recognized that there remains 
ample room to further develop its application of article I, sec- 
tion 22. 
1. Nature of the property 
The first element of an inverse condemnation analysis in 
Utah's courts examines whether the plaintiff possesses a prop- 
erty interest protected by article I, section 22 of the Utah Con- 
stitution. "A claimant must possess some protectible interest in 
property before that interest [sic] is entitled to recover under 
[article I, section 22]."193 "Property" is a term that can be con- 
strued very broadly. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
that the term "'property' includes but is not limited to land and 
improvements subject to the substantive law of real proper- 
ty."lS4 Under this definition, any real estate, structure,lg5 or 
interest in landlg6 would be recognized as a legitimate proper- 
ty interest protected from taking or damaging by article I, 
section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Although the term "property" is interpreted very broadly, it 
does have its limits. For example, in Walker v. Brigham 
citylg7 the plaintiff sued Brigham City, contending that the 
193. Colrnan, 795 P.2d at 625. 
194. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountfil City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 
(citing 2 NICHOLAS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 5 5.45 (3d ed. 1990)). 
195. See, eg., Farmers, 803 P.2d a t  1244 (recognizing the structural damage to 
a commercial mall caused by adjacent construction as a "property interest protected 
by article I, section 22"); Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510, 512 (Utah 1921) 
(considering an inverse condemnation claim for the contamination of a pond and 
the destruction of fish, the court stated that "[tlhe kinds of property subject to the 
[eminent domain right are] practically unlimited"); O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & 
S.L.R. Co., 114 P. 127 (Utah 1911) (finding a house damaged by the vibrations, 
smoke and cinders of a nearby railroad within the definition of protected property 
under article I, section 22). 
196. "An easement is an interest in land, and it is taken in the constitutional 
sense when the land over which it is exercised is taken; but if it is only destroyed 
and ended, a destruction for public purposes may also be an appropriation for the 
same purpose." Cohuzn, 795 P.2d at 625 (quoting 2 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMI- 
NENT DOMAIN 5 5.14 at 5-186 (3d ed. 1989)). Both express and implied easements 
have been recognized as property interests protected by article I, section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution. See, e.g., d. at 625 (recognizing an express easement in an 
underwater canal as protected property); Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 
P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974) (recognizing an implied easement); Hampton v. State 
ex rel. Road Comm'n, 445 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1968) (recognizing a property 
owner's ability to access an abutting highway as protected property); Whiterocks 
Irrigation Co. v. Mooseman, 141 P. 459, 460 (Utah 1914) (recognizing an express 
easement). 
197. 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993). 
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city's "excessive" overcharging for electric utility service was a n  
unconstitutional taking.''' Invoking the property interest ele- 
ment, the court quickly noted that the plaintifrs contention 
failed to "demonstrate that he has 'some protectible interest in  
property.""" For purposes of article I, section 22, the court 
concluded that there is no "property interest in the rate 
charged for utility service."200 
2. Existence of a taking or damage 
Once the court determines that the plaintiff possesses a 
protectible property interest, the court examines whether that 
interest has been taken or damaged. The court defines a tak- 
ing as "any substantial interference with private property 
which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the 
owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial 
degree abridged or destr~yed."~~'  This definition accommo- 
dates the natural idea that a taking has occurred whenever 
state actions lessen a property's value or impair its use.In char- 
acterizing the damage requirement of article I, section 22, the 
court distinguishes between physical damage that is of a one- 
time natureZo2 and damage that is recurrent in nature. One- 
time damage causes monetary loss but does not permanently 
lower the property's value (once it has been repaired), while 
recurrent damage, because of its recurrence, permanently di- *r 
minishes the property's value. "[Dlamages protectible under 
article I, section 22 must be physical and permanent, continu- 
ous, or recurring."203 Damage of a one-time nature causes a 
pecuniary harm, but such one-time damage does not perma- 
nently diminish the property's value. Of course, damage that 
198. Id. at  351. 
199. Id. (quoting Colman, 795 P.2d at  625). 
200. Id. n.20 (citations omitted). 
201. Colman, 795 P.2d at 626 (quoting State ex rel. State Rd. Comm'n v. Dis- 
trict Court, 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937)); see Hampton, 445 P.2d at 711-12. 
202. In Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 
459, 465 (Utah 1989), a business owner's inverse condemnation action against a 
city for injuries resulting from the city's interference with access to the owner's 
store was denied because the damage resulted from a "temporary, one-time occur- 
rence"-the operation and maintenance of a drainage system during and after a 
flood-rather than a "permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring interference 
with property rights." Id. at  465. ' 
203. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 
(Utah 1990). 
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causes a "permanent or recurring interference with property 
rights"204 will amount to a taking.205 
3. Public use requirement 
The third element of an inverse condemnation claim re- 
quires that the taking or damage be effected for the benefit of 
the public, or for a legitimate public use. "[Dlamages which are 
not a direct and necessary consequence of the .  . . public use 
are not recoverable in an inverse condemnation action."20" 
"Damages arising out of the carelessness or negligence or indif- 
ference [of a state agency when acting] for public use are not 
damages contemplated by the statutes as recoverable under the 
principles of law pertaining to eminent domain proceed- 
i n g ~ . " ~ ~ ~  This principle is best illustrated by several examples. 
In O'Neill v. San Pedro, LA. & S.L.R. Co.?O8 the Utah 
Supreme Court held that in an inverse condemnation action, 
recovery is allowed only for injuries that "necessarily [arise] 
from the proper and careful operation of the improvement."209 
Any damages arising &om the railroad's negligent operation of 
its trains were recoverable only in a negligence action.210 In 
Lund v. Salt Lake County?l1 a property owner sought to "re- 
cover damages for injury to certain fish ponds and [the] de- 
struction of fish" caused by contaminated water released into 
the ponds by Salt Lake County.212 The court denied the in- 
verse condemnation claim, holding that "the damages for which 
204. Colman, 795 P.2d at 627. 
205. Id. In Board of Educ. v. Croft, 373 P.2d 697 (Utah 1962), the court pro- 
vided this explanation of what amounted to "damagen under article I, section 22: 
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial impmve- 
ment, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under [Utah's emi- 
nent domain statute], . . . is limited to injuries that would be actionable 
a t  common law, or where there has been some physical disturbance of a 
right, either public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with 
his property and which gives it additional value, and which causes him to 
sustain a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that 
sustained by the public generally. 
Id. at 699. 
206. Farmers, 803 P.2d a t  1245. 
207. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 49 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 
1935) (citation omitted). 
208. 114 P. 127 (Utah 1911). 
209. Id. at 130. 
210. Id. 
211. 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921). 
212. Id. at 511. 
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compensation is allowed under article I, $22, of the State Con- 
stitution are such as are the direct consequences of the lawful 
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that ordinarily 
such damages are una~oidable."~'~ Because these damages 
were not the direct result of an  eminent domain action, the 
court found that the property was "not taken for a public 
use."214 
In two separate opinions, Justice Wade wrote that inverse 
condemnation damages are limited to those necessarily arising 
out of the public use. In Spring~ille~Banking Co. v. Burton,215 
Justice Wade wrote that inverse condemnation damages must 
"grow out of" an intentional public use rather than merely 
result from a negligent or wrongful state actionO2l6 And in 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County:'' Justice Wade noted that 
article I, section 22 "clearly requires the taking or damaging of 
tangible private property, and that the public use . . . be inten- 
tional and not merely accidental or negligently caused."218 
For years the United States Supreme Court failed to afford 
substantive protection under the Fifth Amendment prohibition 
against takings of private property or public use without just 
compensation. This lack of constitutional protection stemmed 
from the interrelation of two powers: the eminent domain pow- 
er and the police power. The eminent domain power allows a 
taking of private property but requires compensation. The 
police power also effectively allows a taking, but, traditionally, 
no just compensation is required even when land's value is 
reduced. Because of the confusion surrounding the exercise of 
these two powers, governments were tempted to achieve emi- 
nent domain goals through exercises of the police power, there- 
by effecting a taking without having to pay just compensation. 
With the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal, 
the Takings Clause was finally given an  active role in constitu- 
tional jurisprudence. Pennsylvania Coal recognized that exer- 
cises of the police power which go too far can constitute an 
213. Id. at 514. 
214. Id. at 513. 
215. 349 P.2d 157 (Utah 1960). 
216. Id. at 166 (Wade, J., concurring). 
217. 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960). 
218. Id. at 110 (Wade, J., dissenting). 
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unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has struggled to clearly 
articulate exactly when an action has gone too far. While its 
efforts have often been criticized, the Court has not completely 
failed to articulate a logical body of law. 
The development of the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of 
the Utah Constitution's takings clause has paralleled that of 
the United States Supreme Court. For many years the Utah 
Supreme Court failed to give any substantial protection under 
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution in much the same 
way that the United States Supreme Court failed to provide 
landowners any protection under the Fifth Amendment's Tak- 
ings Clause. Before its landmark decision in Colnan, the Utah 
court had not recognized any significant protection under 
Utah's takings clause. In  Colmn,  the court abandoned its long- 
held belief that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a 
plaintiff from suing the state whenever the state had damaged 
the plaintiffs property without just compensation. The court 
decided that the Utah Constitution's takings clause requires a 
self-executing remedy that cannot be circumvented by state 
statute. Today, while the Utah analysis is not as detailed as its 
federal counterpart, it at least provides the essential protection 
of private property that was envisioned by the state's founders 
and incorporated into the Utah takings clause. 
David W. TuDs 
